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Copper’s Corollaries:
Trade and Labour Migration in the Copperbelt (1910-1940)
Enid Guene
University of Cologne
The geopolitical importance of the mining industry in Zambia and Katanga, and the rural-urban
migration patterns that it brought about, has been the subject of many studies. And yet, the
extent to which these industries were interdependent is often downplayed or overlooked.
Looking more closely at the history of the Zambian and Katangese Copperbelts, one can see that,
despite their separateness, there was interplay between them. During the British South Africa
Company rule of Rhodesia (1899-1924), Northern Rhodesia was developed as an important
labour and food reserve for the Katangese mines. Following the onset of the Great Depression in
the early 1930s, Katanga’s dependence on Northern Rhodesia diminished as the Katangese
mines found new sources of labour and foodstuffs. Yet, at the same time, it appears that the
Depression served to make the border more porous than it had been before. People of all origins
crisscrossed the border between Belgian and British Africa to look for employment or to sell
their produce. This article aims to bring this interaction to light.
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Introduction
The Copperbelt, as a geological zone, is known for its copper deposits and associated mining and
industrial development. This comparatively small strip of land – covering some 450 km in
length and 260 km in width – has, for about a century, formed the economic backbone of the two
countries that host it: the Republic of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. And
yet, the extent to which these industries were interdependent is often downplayed or
overlooked. The Copperbelt itself, because of its distribution over two countries, is generally
studied as if it consisted of not one but two distinct entities. This, as Luise White contends, has
to do with two factors: a disinclination to mix the history of Francophone and Anglophone
Africa, and the fact that ‘the two histories do not provide a good chronological or comparative
fit’.1 The main discrepancy appearing in the timelines of the two regions is that copper mining in
Katanga (the Congo’s most southern province where the Copperbelt is located) began well
before the First World War, whereas in Northern Rhodesia (as Zambia was known at the time),
it only really took off in the late 1920s. Another element that seems to set the two Copperbelts
apart is the apparent disparity in labour policy. By 1926, before any copper mine was fully
operational in Northern Rhodesia, the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK), Katanga’s allpowerful mining company, had begun to recruit a more permanent labour force. On the
Northern Rhodesian side, on the other hand, a family presence was not yet encouraged.2 This
created the idea that labour was ‘stabilised’ in Katanga while the copper mines of Northern
Rhodesia still relied on a “classic” migrant labour system featuring short-term migration by
rurally based migrants to the urban industrial centres.3 The work of the Rhodes-Livingstone

Louse White, ‘Class struggle and cannibalism: Storytelling and history writing on the copperbelts of
colonial Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo’, in Speaking with vampires: Rumor and history in
colonial Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 274.
2 Ibid, 275.
3 James Ferguson, Expectations of modernity: Myths and meanings of urban life on the Zambian
Copperbelt (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1999), 41.
1
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Institute (RLI) – founded in 1935 with a view to investigate the impact of rapid industrialisation
and urbanisation on local populations – contributed to a large extent to this idea.4 In contrast,
James Ferguson, in his influential Expectations of Modernity, argued that ‘rural-urban mobility
was not always so orderly’5 and that processes of mobility and urbanisation were more varied,
more complex than usually suggested. ‘Already in the 1920s and 1930s’, he argued, ‘many
Copperbelt mineworkers were much more used to long-term urban dwelling than the image of
the cyclical migrant would suggest. Indeed (…) many of the early Copperbelt workers had long
histories of urban employment at other labour centres in the region, especially the Katanga
mines in the Belgian Congo and in the mining centres of Southern Rhodesia’.6 In this way,
different research traditions coupled with a larger tendency, in academia, to think in a ‘nationstate framework of analysis’,7 meant that ‘with few exceptions, the threads that link the two
Copperbelts have been overlooked, and the fluidity with which African labour penetrated
colonial and cultural borders has not been the source with which history was written’.8 In the
present paper, it will be argued that the early development of the ‘two’ Copperbelts, far from
being separate, was in fact defined by interdependence. Looking at the three decades spanning
from about 1910 to about 1940, this paper will explore how transnational migration developed
and consolidated in the colonial period as people looked for better wages and cheaper or better
goods.

Investments and Capital
In the late nineteenth century, Katanga, whose mineral wealth had been advertised by the
works of such iconic travellers as David Livingstone and Frederick Stanley Arnot, had been the
object of an intense competition between European powers. The contenders were King Leopold
II of Belgium and financier Cecil Rhodes who, through his British South Africa Company (BSAC),
was staking out claims to territory in the African interior on behalf of the British government.
After more than two years and six expeditions (three Belgian and three British), it became
obvious that Rhodes had lost the race to the mineral wealth of Katanga, having only been able to
stake out claims as far north as the Luapula River and Lake Mweru in the East and the CongoZambezi watershed in the West, i.e. just below the area where copper deposits were known to
exist.9 As a result, Cecil Rhodes’ company had become the owner of a large territory, located
right between the Katangese Copperbelt to the north and the mineral-rich territories south of
the Zambezi (future Zimbabwe), with no apparent significant mineral wealth of its own.10 That

For a detailed study of the work of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in the twentieth century, see Lyn
Schumaker, Africanizing anthropology: Fieldwork, networks, and the making of cultural knowledge in
Central Africa (Durham and London: Duke UP, 2001).
5 Ferguson, Expectations of modernity, 39.
6 Ferguson, Expectations of modernity, 50.
7 William I. Robinson, ‘Beyond nation-state paradigms: Globalization, sociology, and the challenge of
transnational studies’ Sociological Forum 13, no. 4 (1998) 562.
8 White, ‘Class struggle and cannibalism’, 275.
9 For a detailed description of the ‘Scramble’ for Katanga, see Comité spécial du Katanga, 1900-1950
(Brussels: Editions L. Cuypers, 1950), 11-21. See also Hugh M. Hole, The making of Rhodesia (London and
Edinburgh: Taylor & Francis Group, 1967), 249-50; John W. Donaldson, Marking territory: Demarcation of
the DRC – Zambia boundary from 1894 to the present day, Ph.D. thesis, University of Durham, 2010, 103;
Bruce Fetter, The creation of Elisabethville, 1910-1940 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976), 17.
10 Prospecting, which began in the 1890s, only led to the discovery of minor deposits. Lead and zinc were
found at Broken Hill (now Kabwe) and copper at the ‘Hook’ of the Kafue River as well as at Roan Antelope,
Rietbok and Bwana Mkubwa. Further copper deposits, as well as some gold, were also found at Nkana,
Kipushi and Kansanshi, just 12 miles south of the Katangese border. See Francis L. Coleman, The Northern
4
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territory, known as ‘Northern Rhodesia’, was, as Andrew Roberts put it, ‘an awkwardly shaped
piece of debris resulting from Rhodes’s failure to obtain Katanga’.11 Northern Rhodesia having
proved a disappointment, it was not long before the BSAC turned its attention back to Katanga.
The latter, despite its obvious mineral wealth, had hitherto been left largely unattended by the
Belgians who lacked funds, personnel and capital. This explains why, in 1900, Robert Williams,
one of Rhodes’ former associates and owner of a prospecting company, the Tanganyika
Concessions Limited (TCL), was able to readily obtain from Leopold II the opportunity to
explore the Katangese Copperbelt. By 1906, more than one hundred deposits had been located,
including the gold mine of Ruwe (now Mutoshi), the copper and cobalt mine at Kambove, and
the extremely rich carbonate deposit of the ‘Star of the Congo’ mine, close to which the future
capital of Katanga, Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi), was to be founded in 1910.12 Thanks to
this ‘plenteous bounty’, Katanga was promised a very bright future indeed, being expected to be,
as the Livingstone Mail claimed in 1908, ‘the brightest spot in Africa’.13
In order to handle what promised to be an extremely important mining interest in Katanga, the Comité
Spécial du Katanga (CSK), a semi-private concessionary company responsible for administering the
territory, and the TCL launched a new chartered company on 28 October 1906: the Union Minière du
14
Haut-Katanga (UMHK). The fact that the UMHK was to be a joint venture between British and
Belgian interests stemmed out of necessity. Not only was there no one in Belgium familiar, let alone
experienced, with the mineral industry, but neither was there anyone familiar with Africa and its
population. It is in recognition of that fact that, though the UMHK was Belgian in name, the technical
15
direction, a.k.a. the overseeing of operations on the ground, was entrusted to the TCL. In practice
therefore, it was the TCL that dictated most of the UMHK’s decisions, both short-term and long16
term. In addition, the UMHK was entirely dependent on British southern Africa for the export of its
minerals. There was no connection between Katanga and a seacoast, which was a sine qua non
condition for the export of Katanga copper on a large-scale. There was a project to build a rail link
between Katanga and the Atlantic via the port of Lobito (near Benguela in Angola) but the line, whose
17
construction had started in 1903, was not yet usable (and would not be until 1931). By contrast, the
British railway line from Kimberley (South Africa) had reached Broken Hill (now Kabwe) in
Northern Rhodesia in 1907. Sustained by a financial alliance between the TCL and the BSAC, the

Rhodesia Copperbelt 1899-1962, technological development up to the end of the Central African
Federation (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1962), 6-7; René Brion & Jean-Louis Moreau, De la mine à Mars:
La genèse d’umicore (Tielt: Lannoo, 2006), 67; Charles Perrings, Black mineworkers in Central Africa:
Industrial strategies and the evolution of an African proletariat in the Copperbelt 1911-1941 (London:
Heinemann Educational Books, 1979), 9.
11 Andrew Roberts, A history of Zambia (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1976), 175.
12 Robert Williams, ‘The Cape to Cairo Railway’, Journal of the Royal African Society, 20, no. 80 (1921),
249; Coleman, Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt, 8-9; Perrings, Black mineworkers, 10. For a detailed
description of the initial prospection undertaken in Katanga, see Maurice Robert, Le Katanga physique,
cinquantième anniversaire du Comité Spécial du Katanga, 1900-1950, (2nd edn. Brussels: Editions
Montana, 1950), 95-101; Comité Spécial du Katanga, 53-9.
13 Livingstone Mail, 26 December 1908, as quoted in Coleman, Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt, 14.
14 Robert, Le Katanga physique, 101; Coleman, Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt, 9; Perrings, Black
mineworkers, 10.
15 The first administrative council of the UMHK was composed of five British representatives, all of whom
were attached to the TCL, and five Belgians. See Brion & Moreau, De la mine à Mars, 74-5.
16 Until World War I, the main language of communication in Elisabethville was English. Between 1907
and 1911, the Company even had two European headquarters: a head office in Brussels, where the Belgian
senior management met, and a ‘technical committee’ in London. See White, ‘Class struggle and
cannibalism’, 275; Bruce Fetter, ‘L’Union Minière du Haut-Katanga 1920-1940, La naissance d’une sousculture totalitaire’ Cahiers du CEDAF, 6 (1973), 4.
17 Robert Williams, ‘The Cape to Cairo Railway’, 253; Hance, William A. & Irene S. Van Dongen, ‘The Port of
Lobito and the Benguela Railway’ Geographical Review, 46, no. 4 (1956): 466.
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Southern African line was extended and reached Elisabethville in 1910. Henceforward, the Katanga
mines imported coal and coke from a colliery just south of Victoria Falls, while their copper was
18
exported via Rhodesia Railways to the Mozambican coast. The profits generated through the use of
the Southern African railway were reportedly the means by which the British South Africa Company
was able to survive at all. In August 1931, Sir Robert Williams remarked:
Dr Jameson, when he asked me after Rhodes’s death to try to get a connection for
the Rhodesia Railways to the Katanga mines, told me that unless I got this, the
Chartered Company would go into liquidation as that Company, of which Dr
Jameson was then the president, was losing £300,000 per annum under its
19
guarantee of interest to the Rhodesian Debenture Holders.
In this way a mutually beneficial relationship was developed between Katanga and its southern
neighbour. Katanga got the initial investment and capital that it needed while the Northern
Rhodesian economy was kept afloat. However, given the context of severe imbalanced dual
power in Katanga, it was not long before tension between Belgian and British settlers escalated
within the province in general and the UMHK in particular. By the end of the First World War,
Anglophobia was rife in Elisabethville, allowing Belgium to pursue a policy of ‘nationalisation’ of
20
its industry thanks to which, by the early 1920s, Brussels had finally and definitively come to
replace London as the source of capital for the development of the Katangese Copperbelt. The
Tanganyika Concessions had by then become little more than a holding company and the
combination of British entrepreneurship and capital that had been so vital in the early years had
21
lost its importance. Yet, the UMHK, and the Katangese copper industry in general, could not
break away completely from its English-speaking neighbour. For one thing, if British presence in
the UMHK directorate was diminished it was by no means eradicated. British money kept
flowing in and out of the Union Minière and British directors sat on the board until as late as the
22
1960s. For yet another thing, the two territories were to continue to be economically
interdependent for a while still, not least in terms of infrastructure (of which the railway was
the principal element) but also in terms of labour and trade.

Migrant Labour
A Rhodesian W orkforce for Katanga (1910-1925)
Around the time when initial prospecting was starting to decline in Northern Rhodesia, it
became increasingly clear that, worse than not being lucrative, there was also a danger that the
colony might not even be self-sufficient. At the end of his lengthy 1899 report on the Anglo-

18 Ian Henderson, Labour and politics in Northern Rhodesia, 1900-1953: A study in the limits of colonial
power, Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1972, 57; Roberts, A history of Zambia, 177; Robert, Le
Katanga physique, 103-104; Coleman, The Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt, 12; Williams, ‘The Cape to Cairo
Railway’, 253.
19 Coleman, The Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt, 12.
20 Between 1917 and 1920 many non-Belgians were successfully uprooted from their position of power in
Katanga thanks to the constant campaign of opposition waged by the local Belgian settler community. This
process was made all the easier by the fact that the Belgian franc declined in relation to the pound sterling
after the war making London less keen to invest in Belgian ventures. See Fetter, The creation of
Elisabethville, chapter 4 and Robert, Le Katanga physique, 110-113.
21 Fetter, The creation of Elisabethville, 75-78.
22 Matthew Hughes, ‘Fighting for white rule in Africa: The Central African Federation, Katanga, and the
Congo Crisis, 1958-1965’ The International History Review, 25, no. 3 (2003), 595.
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German boundary, C.F. Close remarked that, though some parts of North East Rhodesia on the
Lower Zambezi river (well south of the boundary with the Belgian Congo) were fertile, the
plateau region between the lakes where the boundary ran was a ‘remote, unhealthy,
unprofitable country’, adding that ‘it is unlikely, unless the native population largely increases in
the next generation, that the country will be able to pay for its own administration’.23 Fifteen
years later, in his official report on the Anglo-Belgian boundary commission, I. Walker made a
similar point:
One can only hope that when N.E. Rhodesia is fully opened up to prospectors and
exploration, minerals (above all tin) will be discovered in workable quantities,
for without this incentive to progress, this country will remain a backwater of
empire for several years to come.24
Walker’s comment turned out to be very insightful. From 1900 to the mid-1920s, Northern
Rhodesia was acted upon as an appendage to its southern counterpart. If Northern Rhodesia
was not to be another Katanga, there was only one economic function for it to perform: to serve
25
as a labour reserve for the expanding mines of southern Rhodesia. There is little doubt that
one of the principle aims of the three shillings hut tax, introduced in the first years of the
twentieth century, was to manipulate the Northern Rhodesian population into engaging in
26
migrant labour. Since opportunities for employment within Northern Rhodesia were scarce,
Northern Rhodesians had few options to pay their tax but to engage in wage labour outside the
27
territory.
At the same time as this was being implemented in Northern Rhodesia, Katangese mines went
into function and were – rather conveniently – in dire need of labour. The labour policy in
Katanga was to copy the South African model in which workers would typically stay for a period
of 6 to 9 months and then be replaced by new recruits. The success of such a scheme
presupposed the comparative proximity of dense population clusters. Therein lay the rub. For
not only was there no transportation means or set routes that could carry potential recruits to
28
the mines, but Katanga was also much less populated than South Africa. In 1912, at the time
when mining in Katanga was entering its industrial phase, Katanga was described as ‘[une terre]
29
inhabitée, sans ressource aucune au point de vue main-d’œuvre et ravitaillement’. In addition,
the region was still bearing the scars left by the era of the Congo Free State, as was noted in
1928 by the Northern Rhodesian Department of Native Affairs:
In the Congo the main difficulties are (1) scarcity of native population (2)
extreme difficulty experienced in persuading the male natives to come out as
wage earners in industry. The reluctance to work for Europeans, it can safely be
said, was caused by the ruthless methods practiced in the early days of the

23 Confidential Report C. F. Close, 24 January 1899, FO 64/1549 (NAZ), p.35, as quoted in Donaldson,
Marking territory, 136.
24 Report by I. Walker on the Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission, 1914, RC/609 (NAZ).
25 Henderson, Labour and politics in Northern Rhodesia, 12; Jane, Parpart, Labor and capital on the African
Copperbelt (Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1983), 16.
26 The Hut Tax was enforced in 1901 in the East of Northern Rhodesia and in 1905 in the West. See Bruce
Fetter, Colonial rule and regional imbalance Central Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 89, 147.
27 Roberts, A history of Zambia, 177.
28 Fetter‚ L’Union Minière du Haut-Katanga’, 12; Edward Clegg, Race and politics: Partnership in the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (London: Oxford UP, 1960), 39.
29 ‘An uninhabited territory without any resource at all in terms of labour and foodstuffs’. See Rapport sur
L’Union Minière du Haut Katanga by Jules Jadot, Mars 1 1912, AGR, UM I, 963 as quoted in Brion & Moreau,
De la mine à Mars, 81.
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Congo Free State to exploit the rubber trade (…) The rubber trade is also
responsible to a great extent for the sparseness of the population.30
For want of any viable alternative, the UMHK started to look towards Northern Rhodesia for the
recruitment of its workforce.31 For this purpose, a subsidiary called the Robert Williams & Co.,
was formed. Robert Williams & Co’.s recruiters, using Fort Rosebery (now Mansa) as a base, set
up an efficient recruitment system, concentrating in the area in Northern Rhodesia within 200
miles of Katanga’s capital city, Elisabethville. In the early years, the Robert Williams & Co. was
the sole provider of labour in Katanga, supplying all the requirements of the UMHK’s three
centres of operations – Ruwe, Kambove and the Star of the Congo – as well as a portion of the
company’s porterage requirements.32
This, however, was the source of some concern for the BSAC, which seemed to resent the fact
that Katanga was diverting some of the labour that could have been sent southwards to support
the development of Southern Rhodesia. 33 According to Charles Perrings the bans against
outward migration and labour recruitment that were enforced in 1905, ostensibly in response
to the sleeping sickness epidemic in the Luapula valley, were in fact part of an attempt to place
‘an embargo on the shipment of all labour from North-Eastern Rhodesia to Katanga’.34
Unfortunately, the closure of the border was less effective a check on African mobility than the
BSAC would have liked.35 By December, the acting administrator was describing the closure of
the river as a ‘dead letter’, arguing that the ‘popularity’ of the Katanga mines was such, due to
their geographical proximity, that no system of patrol could be effective. ‘So long as the natives
have no other lawful sphere of labour’, he went on, ‘they will evade the restrictions on their
movements’.36 At the same time, in Katanga, though a new recruiting agency called the Bourse
du Travail du Katanga (BTK) had been launched in 1910, it was unable to round up enough
recruits to meet the stringent needs of a territory undergoing an industrial and commercial
boom.37 These circumstances made it increasingly obvious to both BSAC and UMHK that a
compromise had to be found. A conference was consequently held at Fort Rosebery in October
1910 where the North-Eastern Rhodesian administration agreed to permit the controlled flow
of labour on the Luapula, on the condition that the Robert Williams & Co. retained control of
recruiting operations inside North-Eastern Rhodesia.38 Further agreements were reached in
May 1911, establishing that Northern Rhodesian workers had to return home at the end of their

Northern Rhodesia Department of Native Affairs in Livingstone to Chief Secretary, 22 December 1928,
SEC1/1472, Doc.1A (NAZ).
31 Perrings, Black mineworkers, 14.
32 Brion & Moreau, De la mine à Mars, 81; Fetter, The creation of Elisabethville, 39.
33 Perrings, Black mineworkers, 15.
34 Perrings, Black mineworkers, 15-16. See Chapter 2 for the measures enforced to fight the spread of the
disease.
35 David M. Gordon, Nachituti’s gift: Economy, society and environment in Central Africa (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 70.
36 Acting Administrator of North-East Rhodesia to the Office of the BSAC in London, December 18 1908 as
quoted Perrings, Black mineworkers, 17.
37 Brion & Moreau, De la mine à Mars, 81.
38 In exchange for allowing the Robert Williams & Co. to recruit freely in Northern Rhodesia, the North
Rhodesian administration requested that the recruits should ‘cross the Luapula at Kalonga and proceed
via Ndola and thence by rail’, that they should be ‘medically examined first in the district where engaged
and again at Ndola’ to avoid the spreading of sleeping sickness, and that no Northern Rhodesian should
enter Katanga voluntarily without a ‘permit’. See L. A. Wallace, North Western Rhodesia Administrator’s
office, Livingstone, to the Vice Governor General, Elisabethville, 26 January 1911, M.O.I. A.34, 3551, Liasse
46 (Brussels African Archives).
30
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terms (six months renewable for six more). Then, finally, in a supplementary agreement
reached in 1913, the Katanga government agreed to the posting of a permanent Inspector of
Rhodesian Labour at the ‘Star of the Congo’ mine.39
By 1920, despite a short drawback towards the end of the First World War (when Northern Rhodesia
40
closed its border temporarily because of the pitiful quality of the labour camps in Katanga ), labour
migration routes were well established and the volume of the movements along them had increased.
The Rhodesians had built themselves a reputation in Katanga for their reliability and resilience and
41
their accumulated experience was a growing asset. Their accommodation was better than those of
the Katangese from the surrounding area, and since they were paid in sterling rather than depreciating
42
Belgian francs, they also enjoyed greater buying power. The number of Northern Rhodesians in
43
Katanga grew steadily over the years with a particularly dramatic and sudden increase in 1920 and
44
1921 (probably related to a rise in hut tax in 1920 ): In February 1919, there were 1,301 Northern
Rhodesian natives employed by Union Minière. By January 1920 there were 5,752, and by January
1921, 5,983. In 1920 and 1921, Northern Rhodesians represented more than half of the Union
45
Minière’s workforce. The vast majority of the Northern Rhodesian recruits came from the Luapula
area (the Awemba and Tanganyika Districts) in North-East Rhodesia. In December 1921, out of the
1,290 Rhodesian recruits that arrived that month, 1,069 came from North-East Rhodesia (158 came
46
from Barotseland and 63 from other areas). North-East Rhodesia had poor soils, was infested with
tsetse flies, which hampered both agriculture and cattle husbandry, and had little to offer in terms of
47
employment opportunities. It is not surprising therefore that Luapulans soon flocked to the
advantageously located Katangese mines to the point of forming the largest part of the UMHK’s
Rhodesian workforce.
From the mid-1920s, however, there was increased evidence that this status quo would not be
sustainable. For one thing, Rhodesian recruits, despite their growing numbers, proved insufficient to
palliate the difficulties in recruiting local labour and satisfy the ever-growing need for labour of a fast
industrialising region. By the end of 1924, the Governor General of the Belgian Congo, Martin
Rutten, warned the Minister of the Colonies that ‘a labour crisis was fast developing’, particularly
alarmingly so in Katanga because of the ‘impuissance où est l’Union Minière du Katanga de

Fetter, The creation of Elisabethville, 39-41.
Report of the Inspector of Rhodesian Natives in the Katanga for February 1919, 28 April 1919,
HC/1/3/53, Tag.1140, Loc.286, Doc. 1053/19, (NAZ).
41 Henderson, Labour and politics in Northern Rhodesia, 46.
42 Fetter, The creation of Elisabethville, 81-85.
43 See Reports of the Inspector of Rhodesian Natives in the Katanga for February 1919 (HC/1/3/53,
Tag.1140, Loc.286, 1053/19 28 April 1919); for January 1920 (A4/1/3, Tag.824, Loc.209, Doc. 80, 27 April
1920); for January 1921 (A4/1/3, Tag.824-Loc.209, Doc. 101, 18 April 1921).
44 Fetter, The creation of Elisabethville, 81.
45 In his 1972 PhD thesis, Ian Henderson, based on the reports of the Inspector of Rhodesian Natives,
calculated that workers of Northern Rhodesian origins went from representing 34% of the UMHK
workforce in 1917 (with 1661 workers) to representing 56 % in 1921 (with 5548 workers). Numbers
dropped the following year (2177 workers, i.e. 33% of the UMHK workforce) but went up again in 1923
(4267 workers, i.e. 43% of the UMHK workforce. See Henderson, Labour and politics in Northern
Rhodesia, 47.
46 Report of the Inspector of Rhodesian Natives in the Katanga for December 1920, 7 March 1921, A4/1/3,
Tag.824-Loc.209, Doc. 99.
47 The Luapula supply areas, i.e. the great plateau of North-Eastern Rhodesia along the Luapula between
Lake Mweru and Bangweolu, comprised the Bemba, Bisa, Mambwe, Iwa, Namwanga, Lungu, Ushi, Chisinga,
Ngumbo and Eastern Lunda peoples. See Henderson, Labour and politics in Northern Rhodesia, 42-44;
Perrings, Black mineworkers,14-15; Giacomo Macola, The Kingdom of Kazembe, history and politics in
North-Eastern Zambia and Katanga to 1950 (Hamburg: LIT Verlag, 2002), 215.
39
40
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maintenir ses effectifs ouvriers à la hauteur de ses besoins’. This crisis, he went on, would not be an
easy one to resolve because at its heart lay a basic conundrum:
Plus s’accentuera l’occupation économique, plus se développeront les voies de
transport, plus s’échelonneront le long de celles-ci les exploitations
commerciales, agricoles, industrielles, petites ou grandes, plus deviendront
précaires les conditions d’existence des grosses entreprises qui doivent recruter
leur main d’œuvre au loin parce que fatalement elles verront se rétrécir de plus
en plus le champ de leurs recrutements et cela en même temps que leurs besoins
augmenteront.49
In another letter dated 25 July of the same year, the same Rutten pointed at another growing
concern, common among industrialists and administrators in Katanga. Though there was little
choice but to employ foreign labour as long as Katangese transportation means and routes were
not better developed, the combined effect of the escalating need for labour and the almost
exclusive reliance on foreign labour constituted a dangerous sword of Damocles for the
Katangese industry:
Il y a des réalités qu’il faut savoir regarder en face : Le Katanga, c’est la grande
industrie qui ne peut se développer, c’est à dire vivre, qu’en produisant toujours
davantage. Pour cela il lui faut beaucoup de main d’œuvre, une main d’œuvre
locale qui seule est assurée ; celle du dehors est précaire et se dérobera en nous
ruinant dés que l’intérêt de concurrents voisins l’exigera.50
And indeed, by the mid-1920s, that prediction was slowly beginning to materialise. At the same
time as labour scarcity was once more becoming increasingly problematic, the UMHK also
gradually ceased to be the sole mining power in the region.

The Rise of the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt (1924-1931)
Until the early 1920s, Britain’s main concern had been to see that Northern Rhodesia was made
to pay for its own upkeep, mostly through the export of labour.51 However within a few years
the situation changed unexpectedly and dramatically thanks to the growth of the automobile
and electrical industries that followed the end of the First World War. These new industries
engendered global demand for copper, considerably boosting copper prices. Towards the end of
1922, instead of granting individual prospecting licences, as it had previously done, the BSAC

48 ‘The inability of the UMHK to maintain a large enough labour force to meet its needs’. See, Office of the
Governor General of the Belgian Congo, M. Rutten, to the Minister of the Colonies, Boma, 2 December
1924, M.O.I. A 34, 3544, Liasse 3 (Brussels African Archives).
49 ‘The more economic activity expands, the more transportation routes are developed, the more
commercial, agricultural and industrial exploitations, both small and large, spring up along them, the more
precarious the conditions of existence of the large companies will be, which have to recruit their labour
force from faraway places because they ineluctably see their recruiting sphere diminish at the same time
as their needs increase’. Ibid.
50 ‘There are realities that need to be faced: Katanga is a large industry that can only expand, i.e. survive, by
constantly producing more. To do this, it needs a large labour force, a local labour force which is the only
one that is guaranteed; labour from outside is precarious and will evaporate, ruining us in the process, as
soon as the interests of our neighbouring competitors will demand it’. See Governor General of the Belgian
Congo to the Minister of the Colonies, 25 July 1924, M.O.I. A 34, 3562, Liasse 84 (Brussels African
Archives).
51 Roberts, A history of Zambia, 185; Parpart, Labor and capital on the African Copperbelt, 19.
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began to grant exclusive prospecting rights to large mining concerns over extensive areas.52
Two fish were hooked: A. Chester Beatty, a London-based mining financier whose holding
company, Selection Trust Ltd provided some funds in 1920; and Sir Ernest Oppenheimer,
founder of the Anglo American Corporation, who joined forces in 1924. New prospecting soon
revealed large sulfide deposits containing copper at workable depths near Ndola close to the
Belgian Congo border.53 By 1930 four large new mines were being developed on the Copperbelt:
Roan Antelope (Luanshya), Nkana (Kitwe), Mufulira and Nchanga (Chingola). The Rhodesian
branch of Oppenheimer’s Anglo American Corporation developed the Nchanga and Nkana mine,
forming the Rhokana Corporation Ltd in 1931 to manage the latter. Beatty’s Selection Trust
incorporated the Roan Antelope and Mufulira mines in 1927 and 1930 respectively. In 1931,
despite the worldwide Depression, Roan Antelope and Nkana went into production; Mufulira
began producing in 1933; and a refinery was opened at Nkana in 1934. As a result, the value of
exports increased spectacularly (five-fold) between 1930 and 1933.54
However, the newly formed Copperbelt companies were at first hard pressed to obtain
sufficient African labour. One part of the problem lay in the fact that no local labour was
available. As the Compound Manager of Nkana noted:
The Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt is a sparsely populated District, the supply of
labour being totally inadequate to keep any large industry going and moreover
the quality of the labour is very poor. It is therefore necessary to import labour
from districts further afield.55
This lack of local labour meant that the Copperbelt mines had little choice but to engage in the
migrant labour system. When they did so, however, they encountered stiff competition. Labour
routes to other industrial centres had already been well established, having been trodden for
two decades. In 1928 it was reported that some 15.7 % of the male population of Northern
Rhodesia was working outside the territory, in the mines of Katanga, Southern Rhodesia, South
Africa and even Tanganyika.56 To counteract this trend, the Copperbelt companies adopted a
series of strategies. In December 1925, they convinced the government of Northern Rhodesia to
put an official limit on the number of Rhodesians allowed to work in Katanga.57 In May 1929,
representatives of the two main Copperbelt Companies met together with the governor of Ndola
and agreed to establish a new labour bureau: the Native Labour Association and by 1931, the
Association had 27 agents stationed at strategic points throughout the territory. In this way, the
mines secured the major part of their labour force by recruiting in distant regions, usually east
of the Fort Rosebery: the area favoured by Congo recruiters. To compete with them, Northern
Rhodesian mines offered short contracts of 180 days’ work, and of course, wages were also
forced up considerably, as each mine tried to outbid the other, as well as the Union Minière.58

52 Clegg, Race and politics, 37; Larry J. Butler, Copper empire, mining and the colonial in Northern
Rhodesia, c.1930-1964 (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2008), 14; Coleman, The Northern Rhodesia
Copperbelt, 32.
53 Parpart, Labor and capital on the African Copperbelt, 20.
54 Roberts, A history of Zambia, 186; Elena L. Berger, Labour, race and colonial rule: The Copperbelt from
1924 to Independence, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 5-6.
55 W.J. Schriviner (Compound Manager at Nkana), Report on Native Labour as Affecting the Copper
Industry of Northern Rhodesia, 17 August 1934, SEC1/1293, Doc. 1 (NAZ).
56 Northern Rhodesia Department of Native Affairs in Livingstone to Chief Secretary, 22 December 1928,
SEC1/1472, Doc.1A (NAZ), 6.
57 Fetter, ‘L’Union Minière du Haut-Katanga’, 18.
58 Parpart, Labor and capital on the African Copperbelt, 33-34; Perrings, Black mineworkers, 93; Berger
(1974): 13.
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These strategies did know a measure of success. At the same time foreign labour, mainly from
Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia, was also increasingly attracted to the north. Early in 1927
there were about 8,500 workers on all the mines and concessions in the territory. At the end of
1928 the figure had risen to 16,073; to 22,341 at the end of 1929; to 29,689 at the end of 1930;
and to a peak of 31,941 in September 1930.59 However none of these measures succeeded in
meeting the demands of the new mines and general labour scarcity endured. The companies
struggled to offer conditions of employment comparable, or nearly comparable to those at
neighbouring mines and there, as was noted by the Department of Native Affairs in 1928, lay the
heart of the problem:
Our greatest and most serious problem is that the best of our labourers proceed
to Southern Rhodesia, Congo Belge and even Tanganyika Territory in quest of
employment in preference to working in our own territory because of the better
conditions of employment and the better terms of wages offered them in these
places. There is no reason to believe that this state of affairs will alter until
employers in Northern Rhodesia pay the same wages as can be obtained
elsewhere and conditions in respect of housing, feeding, medical treatment etc.
60
are improved.
Major G. St. J. Orde Browne, an expert on colonial labour policy, remarked in 1933 that the
extent to which the African worker travelled and compared conditions of employment was not
generally realised.61 News travelled rapidly along the established labour routes, and conditions
on the mines of Katanga, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, as well as Tanganyika were
well known. The general labour shortage of the 1920s in central Africa put skilled workers in a
relatively good bargaining position in the labour market: jobs were plentiful and experienced
workers in short supply. Northern Rhodesians knew they could change jobs easily, which they
did, sometimes even before the end of their contracts.62 The Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, as
the newcomer, found it particularly difficult to compete with industries that were better
established and better ‘stocked’.
It is no wonder therefore that when the Northern Rhodesian mines began construction in 1926,
labourers did not flock to them. Katanga was a particularly tough act to follow, the standards of
living of its mines having been described as ‘positively amazing’ by Orde Browne in 1929.63
From 1926 on, to palliate the effects of the Northern Rhodesian government’s decision to
restrict the number of Northern Rhodesians in Katanga, the Union Minière had decided ‘on an
attempt to settle a native population on their properties and thus provide themselves with a
permanent resident labour supply’.64 From 1927, the UMHK began to enlist workers on three

Berger, Labour, race and colonial rule, 13; Parpart, Labor and capital on the African Copperbelt, 34.
Northern Rhodesia Department of Native Affairs in Livingstone to Chief Secretary, 22 December 1928,
SEC1/1472, Doc.1A (NAZ), 2.
61 Granville St.J. Orde Browne, The African labourer (London: Oxford UP, 1933), 120.
62 Very high rate of desertions were reported every month on both sides of the border. In the mine of
Luishia in Katanga in particular, desertions were described as ‘high’ in Report of the Inspector of
Rhodesian Natives in the Katanga for January 1921, 18 April 1921, A4/1/3, Tag.824, Loc.209, Doc. 101
(NAZ). In all the Northern Rhodesian mines, desertions were a regular occurrence. Berger, Labour, race
and colonial rule, 13.
63 Report by Labour Commissioner by Major G. St. J. Orde Browne on his Tour through the Belgian Congo
and Angola, August 1929, SEC1/1472, Doc. 4, August 1929, Doc. 4 (NAZ).
64 W. J. Schriviner (Compound Manager at Nkana), Report on Native Labour as Affecting the Copper
Industry of Northern Rhodesia, 17 August 1934, SEC1/1293, Doc. 1 (NAZ), 4.The fact that Katanga mines
were mostly open-cast mines meant that it was both possible and economical to use machinery on a large
59
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year contracts and increasingly, though not exclusively, sought to attract men from within the
Congo or Rwanda-Urundi.65 In order to attract settled labour, a dramatic upgrading of African
living conditions had been achieved by the end of the decade: the company built better houses
and hospitals for employees and granted small salary increases and better food.66 This made
Katanga very attractive for Rhodesian workers and, even though the UMHK did indeed
increasingly hire labour from within Congo, many Northern Rhodesians were still hired,67 as is
apparent from the UMHK recruiting statistics in the 1920s.

Belgian
Congo

Northern Rhodesia
(North-East Rhodesia + Barotse
and Balovale)

RuandaUrundi

Other
Countries

1922

3,395

3,332

-

651

1923

4,690

3,296

-

487

1924

6,003

5, 586

-

528

1925

7,943

5,180

206

394

1926

8522

3,058

1,353

779

1927

10,435

3,623

793

597

1928

9,888

4,196

1,273

633

Table 1. UMHK labour force nationalities statistics for the period 1922-192868

scale. This further enhanced the need for a skilled and stable workforce. It also meant that fewer workers
were needed.
65 In 1926 the government granted the company recruitment rights in the Maniema District of Orientale
province as well as in the mandated territory of Ruanda-Urundi. In 1927 these rights were extended to
three territories of the Lomami district: Kabinda, Tshofa and Kanda-Kanda. See Fetter, The creation of
Elisabethville, 90.
66 Ibid, 94. The then governor General had put particular emphasis on the upgrading of the workers’ living
conditions as part of an industrial strategy. ‘Hygiène, éducation et instruction : tel doit être notre leitmotiv’, he wrote in 1924. See, Office of the Governor General of the Belgian Congo, M. Rutten, to the
Minister of the Colonies, 2 December 1924, M.O.I. A 34, 3544, Liasse 3 (Brussels African Archives).
67 Parpart, Labor and capital on the African Copperbelt, 32; Fetter, ‘L’Union Minière du Haut-Katanga’, 32.
68 UMHK Annual and Quaternary Reports for the years 1923, 1925, 1926, 1927, 1928. See References.
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Belgian
Congo

RuandaUrundi

Other
Countries

1929

9,432

2,528

4,664

1930

9,026

4,121

2,434

1931

6,866

2,316

866

Table 2. UMHK labour force nationalities statistics for the period 1929-193169
Yet the total number of Rhodesians present in Katanga is likely to have been much larger than
the number of UMHK employees may indicate. In 1924 J. P. McGregor, the British Vice-Consul in
Elisabethville, estimated that his office looked after the interests of 10,000 Rhodesians when
only half that number was reported to be working for the UMHK at the time.70 There are several
reasons for this discrepancy. First was the fact that the UMHK was not the sole employer in
Katanga. The expansion of Katanga was paralleled in other industries and by 1924, industrial
and commercial employment in Katanga outside the UMHK accounted for an average of 12,000
men.71 In addition, Northern Rhodesians were also engaged in non-industrial wage labour. They
worked as artisans, shopkeepers and, more importantly as ‘houseboys’ as it was ‘a recognised
fact that the Rhodesian natives are better servants. They are a pleasanter type and are better
mannered, though their manners soon deteriorate after they have been a little time in the
Congo’.72 As late as 1929, the total number of Rhodesian male natives employed in Katanga as a
whole was ‘estimated approximately at 11000 or 12000’ when only a few thousands were
reportedly employed by the UMHK (see tables 1 and 2).73 Another element that explains the
sudden increase in Northern Rhodesian presence in Katanga was the fact that, in 1923, the
Union Minière du Haut-Katanga decided to allow labour recruits to bring their wives and
families to the mining townships, arguing that a man accompanied by his wife was more likely
to be contented and consequently would both stay longer and be a better worker.74 In 1929,
therefore, despite restrictions enforced by both Katangese and Northern Rhodesian authorities,
the Northern Rhodesian community in Katanga had remained large, representing 37.5% of the
population in the UMHK’s compounds of the Elisabethville area and 44% of the population of
the Elisabethville district as a whole.75

UMHK Annual and Quaternary Reports for the years 1929, 1930, 1931. See References.
Henderson, Labour and politics in Northern Rhodesia, 70.
71 The major part was employed by the railways but others were also employed by more recent
undertakings such as the Charbonnages de Luena, the Société Coloniale de Construction, the Société Belge
Industrielle et Minière du Katanga and the Société Ciments du Katanga. See Perrings, Black mineworkers,
49.
72 Report on Rhodesian Natives in Katanga, 22 October 1929, SEC1/1472, Doc. 6 (NAZ), 4.
73 Ibid, 1.
74 W. J. Schriviner (Compound Manager at Nkana), Report on Native Labour as Affecting the Copper
Industry of Northern Rhodesia, 17 August 1934, SEC1/1293, Doc.1 (NAZ), 3.
75 Fetter, The creation of Elisabethville, 99.
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The Change in the Direction of Labour M igration (1931 -1940)
By the time Northern Rhodesian copper entered the world market in 1931, the onset of a severe
depression dramatically reduced the price and demand for copper. In copper mining, the
Depression years were 1929 to 1936, with copper prices starting to fall in mid-1930 and hitting
bottom in 1932.76 Mining companies in both southern Katanga and Northern Rhodesia reacted
to the slump in copper prices by curtailing production and reducing the size of their labour
force. Recruitment for the Katanga mines in Northern Rhodesia, which had already been
decreasing for some years, came to a final end on July 31, 1931. In addition more than twothirds of the UMHK workforce was laid off – the labour force was reduced from 16,000 to less
than 5,000 Africans between 1930 and 1932 – with the Northern Rhodesians being especially
targeted.77 The number of Northern Rhodesians settled in Katanga drastically reduced from an
approximated population of 20,000 in 1929 to an approximated population of 7,200 in 1932.78
In the meantime, due to the combined effect of the Depression and the repatriation of Northern
Rhodesia-born miners from the Congo, workers started to flock in the Northern Rhodesian
mines in such numbers that the latter were able to disband recruitment in 1932.79 What had
been the companies’ dearest hope just a year or two before, now was almost an inconvenience
as there were more voluntaries than the Northern Rhodesian mines could realistically
accommodate. In addition, the Depression was eventually to close all of the Northern Rhodesian
mines except Roan Antelope and Nkana, and even these two remaining mines sharply scaled
back production.80 African employees on the mines, which had hit a peak of 31,941 at the height
of the construction boom in September 1930, dropped to 6,677 at the end of 1932.81 Gradually,
however, the Depression lifted and the mines began to recover. Mufulira reopened in October
1933 and production facilities expanded at all three major mines. 82 As the world moved
towards war for the second time, the demand for copper rose and prices followed accordingly.83
From then on the Copperbelt enjoyed a phase of sustained growth thanks to which Northern
Rhodesia was firmly established as one of the world’s major copper producers by 1945.
Accordingly, between 1935 and 1941, employment on the mines rose from 13,734 to 27,602,
which was still a few thousand less than it had been at its peak in 1930. This reflected the vastly
increased scale of operations at Mufulira, the reopening of Nchanga, and significant expansion at
both Roan Antelope and Nchanga.84 At the same time, there were substantial improvements in
underground conditions, so that in many mines the conditions in which men worked improved
and remuneration for skilled labour increased, bringing about an era of increased stabilisation
in the workforce.85
Yet, despite the seemingly clear-cut situation that has just been presented, it is, in fact, difficult
to ascertain the precise timing of changes in the direction of labour migration at this time. It is

76 Prices dropped precipitously from £112.635s per ton in 1929 to £27.25s per ton in February 1932. See
White, ‘Class struggle and cannibalism’, 282; Parpart, Labor and capital on the African Copperbelt, 21.
77 Fetter, The creation of Elisabethville, 123; Fetter, ‘L’Union Minière du Haut-Katanga’, 153; Perrings,
Black mineworkers, 101; Roberts, A history of Zambia, 191.
78 Report on Rhodesian Natives in the Katanga by the Acting British Vice Consul in Elisabethville as at
December 31st 1932, 15 February 1933, SEC2/165, Doc. 18 (NAZ).
79 Patrick O. Ohadike, Development of and factors in the employment of African migrants in the copper
mines of Zambia (Manchester : Manchester UP [for] University of Zambia, Institute for Social Research,
1969), 1.
80 Coleman, The Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt, 66.
81 Ferguson, Expectations of modernity, 50; Ohadike (1969):1.
82 Parpart, Labor and capital on the African Copperbelt, 21.
83 Coleman, The Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt, 143.
84 Ohadike, Development of and ractors in the employment of African migrants, 1.
85 White, ‘Class struggle and cannibalism’, 283.
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even more difficult to assess its significance. Blurring the picture is the fact that official data on
migrant labour for that period is sorely lacking. The Northern Rhodesian government, which
was only interested in labour in as much as it permitted the laws of supply and demand to
operate freely, was insulated from the realities of labour conditions until the first Copperbelt
strike broke out in 1935, and even then it took an additional few years before anything
86
happened to change this state of affairs. Orde Browne, attempting to analyse labour conditions
in Northern Rhodesia in 1938, found that labour problems had been ignored in government
annual reports: ‘Statistics of the movement of natives, analyses of contract, records of court
cases under industrial legislation and similar particulars, are not to be found: wider aspects of
87
the problem are hardly mentioned’. This haze of ignorance is a major handicap in attempting
to quantify and analyse African labour before 1940. Henderson summarises the labour
movements of the 1930s as follows:
If it is possible to generalise about the wage-labour activities of Africans in the
1920s and 1930s, one might say that labour migration continued unabated and
uncontrolled by the government. The direction of the migration changed, but
the volume continued unchanged except by the economic slump of 1931-33.88
Henderson adds however that the exact number of ex-Katanga mineworkers who went directly
to the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt remains an ‘open question’.89 It is likely that the new
market provided by the Copperbelt was seen as a potential life-belt by many of them, especially
the inhabitants of the Luapula, who depended heavily on copper mining. In 1930, only 1,620 (or
25%) of the 6,420 voluntary mineworkers from Mweru-Luapula Province were estimated to
have proceeded to southern Katanga while all the others were said to have proceeded to the
Copperbelt.90 The fact that the Northern Rhodesian government stayed largely unconcerned
with labour issues until 1935 also meant that the composition and provincial origins of the
original Copperbelt labour force is obscure. The fact that as many as 60% of the able-bodied
Bemba men aged from 15 to 45 were reported to be away from their villages in 1931 seems to
indicate that they constituted the bulk of the unskilled labour force.91 Nyasaland also supplied a
large number of workers.92
As for the Rhodesian presence in Katanga, it would be wrong to think that it was wiped out.
Many Northern Rhodesians remained in Katanga throughout the 1930s. In 1933, though their
number in the UMHK workforce had gone down so much that it became almost insignificant
(there were 230 Rhodesian and Nyasaland natives employed by the UMHK at that time93), it
was also reported that:
There are some 3,000 male Rhodesian natives employed in the town itself,
practically, if not all, domestic servants and office boys are Rhodesian. In
addition there are between 350 and 450 Rhodesian natives who have settled in
the villages round the town as market gardeners. They rent the ground from the

Henderson, Labour and politics in Northern Rhodesia, 68.
G. St.J. Orde Browne, Labour conditions, para. 6, as quoted in Henderson, Labour and politics in
Northern Rhodesia, 69.
88 Ibid, 60.
89 Ibid, 71.
90 Macola, The Kingdom of Kazembe, 215.
91 Coleman, The Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt, 65.
92 Henderson, Labour and politics in Northern Rhodesia, 72
93 Report on Rhodesian Natives in the Katanga by the Acting British Vice Consul in Elisabethville as at
December 31st 1932, 15 February 1933, SEC2/165, Doc. 18 (NAZ).
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Comité spécial and sell their produce in Elisabethville at the market which is
94
held twice a week.
This said, it is undeniable that there was net decline in Northern Rhodesian population and that
the lives of those who chose to remain were becoming increasingly difficult. The Rhodesians
remaining on the mines – now representing only 5% of the workforce – were reportedly ‘mainly
skilled or trained workmen who have long periods of service with the Union Minière behind
95
them and who have been retained for this reason’. For the rest of the Northern Rhodesians,
those who were unemployed, independent workers, or who for whatever reason were not as
immovable as the qualified miners, life in Katanga was markedly more uncertain. Belgian
administrators attempted to pursue the same policy as the UMHK of reducing foreign presence
in the native towns. Workers were expelled if they remained unemployed for more than a
month. To cope with this situation, many jobless married men sent their families back to the
96
villages, and many left Katanga altogether. Yet, the fact that there had been a Northern
Rhodesian presence in Katanga for two decades made sure that there would a significant
number of Northern Rhodesians ‘visitors’, as workers would regularly come and gauge their
working possibilities. In 1930-31 alone, the British Vice Consulate in Elisabethville registered
97
4,480 Northern Rhodesian men who left Katanga, while 3,652 new arrivals took their place.
The exact fluctuation in volume of Northern Rhodesian ‘visits’ is difficult to ascertain but their
98
numbers reportedly went from 110 in 1931 to 1,335 in 1932. Even where numbers are
lacking, the evidence of cultural exchange attest to the volume of cross-border migration.
Religious movements, witch-finding movements, and new dance fads crossed the border
99
regularly. Particularly telling is the ease with which Kitawala (or Watchtower), a millenarian
movement widespread in Southern Africa, penetrated Katangese circles to the dismay of the
colonial administration. Conditions of insecurity and economic distress and the constant threat
100
of expulsion made Northern Rhodesians particularly receptive to Kitawala teachings. Even
more revealing is the ease with which rumours spread across borders. Luise White offers a
detailed study of how one such rumour relating to vampire men (known as banyamas in
Northern Rhodesia and as batumbula in the Congo) gained momentum in both Copperbelts
between 1930 and 1964. Following stories of ‘mysterious’ disappearances, strangers, European
doctors, corpulent administrators, prospectors, surveyors and tourists were all highly suspected
of being banyamas. In her Speaking with Vampires, White not only shows how these stories
were to a large extent a symptom of the ‘mood’ of dissatisfaction and confusion among the
African population in a period of deep economic recession, but she also points out how these
stories, which were widespread in an area encompassing Katanga and all of the former BSAC
territories, were also extremely similar in the way they were told and the elements that they
101
comprised.
The prevalence, pervasiveness and similarity of these stories are another
indicator of the extent to which people penetrated colonial borders at the time.
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Ibid.
96 Fetter, The creation of Elisabethville, 126-127.
97 Ibid.
98 Report on Rhodesian Natives in the Katanga by the Acting British Vice Consul in Elisabethville as at
December 31st 1932, 15 February 1933, SEC2/165, Doc. 18 (NAZ).
99 White, ‘Class struggle and cannibalism’, 276.
100 For a detailed study of the development and impact of the Kitawala movement in Katanga and Southern
Africa, see Higginson, John, ‘Liberating the captives: Independent watchtower as an avatar of colonial
revolt in Southern Africa and Katanga, 1908-1941’ Journal of Social History, 26, no. 1 (1992).
101 See White, ‘Class struggle and cannibalism’ and Mwelwa C. Musambachime, ‘The impact of rumor: The
case of the Banyama (Vampire Men) Scare in Northern Rhodesia, 1930-1964’ The International Journal of
African Historical Studies, 21, no. 2 (1988).
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Trade and Markets
In the wake of the burgeoning mining industry, another catalyst for migration and economic
interdependence received an enormous boost: trade. Trade was not a colonial innovation. The
fact that trade predates the establishment of the copper industry is well supported by
archaeological and literary evidence. Both point to the existence, from at least the beginning of
the second millennium, of extended regional trade systems thanks to which subsistence and
prestige goods – not least among which was copper – travelled widely. As for the ravages of the
infamous trade in ivory, slaves and rubber that peaked in the late nineteenth century, they too
are well known and documented.102 Yet these types of trade, extensive though they might have
been, were of a different kind than the large-scale, institutionalised and wide-ranging marketing
that developed in the Copperbelt in the early twentieth century. The latter came about as a
direct result of the creation of large clusters of population that were entirely dependent on
rations or marketed food.103 In other words, the growth and development of large-scale trade in
African foodstuff in the Copperbelt was a by-product of industrialisation and urbanisation.
Feeding Katanga: An Alternative to M igrant Labour
Despite their (eventual) economic expansion, neither Katanga nor Northern Rhodesia were
renowned for the diversity of their economy. In a regional survey carried out in 1960, the
Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt was described as ‘a compact economic oasis with seven springs,
surrounded by a most extensive economic desert’. 104 Agriculture was particularly
underdeveloped. Only very few areas of Northern Rhodesia were made use of to produce some
international market-oriented crops; tobacco was grown in the east of the country, in the Fort
Jameson (Chipata) area, and small amounts of coffee were produced by plantation agriculture in
the Abercorn area (Mbala) in the north-east.105 So if Northern Rhodesia was used as a labour
reservoir, it was considered to have little chance of becoming a grain one. And yet, for a while, it
came to play just that role for the mines of Katanga.
During the first decade of the twentieth century, the newly opened mines of Katanga were in
great need of large quantities of foodstuffs to feed their new workforce. However the mining
area of the Haut-Katanga, a high-plateau area (1,200 to 1,800 metres) with sandy soils, did not a
priori offer favourable conditions for agriculture.106 Southern Katanga in general, though it did
contain small strips of fertile land, was characterised by what Bogumil Jewsiewicki calls ‘a nearabsence of extensive areas capable of supporting large-scale mechanised agriculture’.107 The

See Jan Vansina, ‘Long-distance trade-routes in Central Africa’ The Journal of African History, 3, no. 3
(1962); Richard Gray & David Birmingham, ‘Some economic and political consequences of trade in Central
and Eastern Africa in the pre-colonial period’ in Richard Gray & David Birmingham (eds.), Pre-colonial
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Maret, ‘Sanga: New excavations, more data and some related problems’ The Journal of African History, 18,
no. 3 (1977).
103 Vellut, Jean-Luc, ‘Rural poverty in Western Shaba, c.1890-1930’ in Robin H. Palmer & Neil Parsons
(eds.), The roots of rural poverty in central and Southern Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press
1977), 301.
104 Special Commissioner to Ministry of Land and Natural Resources in Ndola, Report on a Regional Survey
of the Copperbelt, 1 February 1960, WP1/2/64, Doc. 19 (NAZ).
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nearest areas with agricultural potential were the Kamalondo plain in the north along the
Lualaba River and the Luapula-Moëro (Mweru) plain in the north-east. These, however, in the
absence of river routes or railways, were too difficult to reach.108 Eventually, after several
measures taken to deal with this problem locally, such as the attempt to build up a substantial
European farming community,109 proved unsuccessful, it became imperative to find new foodsupplying areas. One of the most immediate candidates was Northern Rhodesia. Northern
Rhodesia had means of transportation, and since the Katangese mines were already tapping into
Northern Rhodesian labour reserves, it was not much of a stretch to include foodstuffs into the
deal as well. Accordingly, in March 1911, Robert Williams & Co. concluded a major agreement
with the firm of King and Werner in North-Western Rhodesia, under which the latter was
contracted to supply the mines with the bulk of their requirements of both grain and beef.110
These were, for the most part, raised by white immigrants, mainly Afrikaners from South Africa,
who had begun to settle in Northern Rhodesia in the years that followed the Boer War. They
were strung out along the railway that ran from Livingstone to Broken Hill, which happened to
run through a tsetse-free and relatively fertile belt. The Katanga market expanded rapidly after
the railway reached Elisabethville in 1910. Between 1911 and 1915, the white farmers of
Northern Rhodesia were supplying most of the foodstuffs – cattle and maize – that fed the
miners in Katanga.111 In turn, Katanga, though it never represented a very large market (exports
to it from Northern Rhodesia averaged about 50,000 bags per year in 1911-15 and peaked at
around 100,000 in 1927), became the main outlet for all Northern Rhodesian producers for
nearly two decades.112 A prominent settler commented in 1913 that the Katanga mines had
been ‘the saviour of this country; but for them I don’t know what would have become of us’.113
Africans too produced foodstuffs for Katanga, especially in the region where – incidentally – the
bulk of the Katanga Rhodesian labour force came from: the Luapula. The Mweru-Luapula region
emerged as an important food supply area for the same reason that it emerged as an important
labour supply area: its geographical proximity to the growing industrial sites of Katanga.114
Fish, in particular, became the winning asset of the Mweru-Luapula. The Mweru-Luapula had no
shortage of water, hosting or being adjacent to three lakes (Lake Mweru, Lake Tanganyika and
Lake Bangweolu), two rivers (the Luapula River and the Kafue River) and the Lukanga swamps.
The volume of trade between the lower Luapula valley and the Katangese mining towns
increased substantially between 1912 and 1915.115 By 1927, the urban population of southern
Katanga – the main market for Luapulan fish throughout the colonial era – seems to have
consumed ‘some 500 tons of fish worth £5,000 and nearly the same quantity of native flour

Jewsiewicki, ‘Unequal development’, 318-321.
In 1911, as part of an attempt to boost the settling process in Katanga, farms were created along the
railway lines and Belgian settlers were dispatched to Katanga. These ventures were not as successful as
they could have been mostly because farming and agriculture were still acted upon as less of a priority
compared to the development of the mining industry. See Robert, Le Katanga physique, 124; Comité
Spécial du Katanga, 236.
110 Perrings, Black mineworkers, 19.
111 Henderson, Labour and politics in Northern Rhodesia, 11-12; Roberts, A history of Zambia, 177;
Mwelwa C. Musambachime, ‘Escape from tyranny: Flights across the Rhodesia-Congo boundary 19001930’ Transafrican Journal of History, 18 (1989), 153-54.
112 Kenneth P. Vickery, ‘Saving settlers: Maize control in Northern Rhodesia’ in Journal of Southern African
Studies, 11, no. 2 (1985), 215.
113 Livingstone Mail, 5 December 1913, as quoted in Vickery, ‘Saving settlers’, 215.
114 Mwelwa. C. Musambachime, ‘The role of Kasenga (Eastern Shaba) in the development of MweruLuapula Fishery’ African Studies Review, 38, no. 1 (1995), 57.
115 Ibid, 55-56.
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valued at £600’.116 Though unstable (it depended on the prosperity of urban markets) the
fishing industry brought the lower Luapula valley a new relative prosperity in the late 1920s.
The Depression and the abrupt reduction in the demand for fish was to affect this business
rather badly but the Second World War, increasing as it did the demand for copper and
consequently for fish, allowed fish exports to southern Katanga to return to the same level as
the late 1920s. In this way, fishing became an alternative to wage employment for a growing
percentage of the residents of the Mweru-Luapula and allowed them to vary the ways in which
they could make a living.117
In the 1910s and 1920s, the volume of food supplies imported and consumed in Haut-Katanga
rose steadily, concurrently with the number of industrial workers employed in the region. In
1917-19 food consumption in Haut-Katanga was around 8,000 to 10,000 tonnes, of which
probably 40 to 50 % was produced locally, the remainder being imported.118 However, the
constant increase in the demand for food during the 1920s and the desire to make the
Katangese economy less dependent on the Rhodesias, led the Katangese authorities to gradually
review their agricultural strategy and search for new supply areas within the Belgian colonies.
One crucial development in this regard was the opening up of new railway lines.119 On 12 July
1928 the Chemin de fer du Bas-Congo au Katanga (BCK), which linked Bukama, near the copper
mines, to Port-Francqui (now Ilebo) in the neighbouring province of Kasai, was inaugurated.
Then in 1931, the Tenke-Dilolo line linked the BCK to the Benguela railway of Portuguese
Angola, and hence opened up Upper Lulua. These new lines, in addition to constituting a new
export route for Katangese copper, not only enabled Kasai and Lulua respectively to send
foodstuffs to the Haut-Katanga for the first time, but also contributed largely to boosting
agricultural production in Katanga itself.120 Throughout the 1920s and culminating in 1928 with
the appointment of a new Governor of Katanga, Gaston Heenen, practical measures were
implemented with a view to making local food-production self-sufficient: experts were called
out, cattle was imported, experimental farms were created and market gardens, cultivated and
overseen by ‘agriculteurs indigènes’ were developed around Elisabethville, Jadotville, Lubudi,
Albertville and Sakania.121 The decisive turning-point came in 1934 when it was agreed that the
province of Katanga should be divided into two zones agricoles (Tanganika and Upper Katanga).
These new zones were in turn subdivided into regions économiques designated as producers of
food for the urban centres. In theory, the Tanganika zone was to be self-sufficient while the
Upper Katanga zone would be supplied from Kasai and Lomami.122 With the province so divided

W. Owen, Kawambwa Sub-District, annual report, 1927, encl. in E. Sharpe, Mweru-Luapula District,
annual report, 1927, ZA7/1/11/8 (NAZ), as quoted in Macola, The Kingdom of Kazembe, 216.
117 Macola, The Kingdom of Kazembe, 216; Gordon, Nachituti’s gift, 68; Henderson, Labour and politics in
Northern Rhodesia, 62. For a detailed study of fishery in the Mweru-Luapula, see Gordon, Nachituti’s gift.
118 Jewsiewicki, ‘Unequal development’, 320.
119 To be noted that several minor railway lines were built between 1910 and 1918. In 1910, the Chemins
de Fer des Grands Lacs Africains (CFL) brought a railway from Kindu, on the Lualaba River, to Kongolo
further down the river which made the transport of goods to Bukama possible. Then the Kabila-Albertville
line, which linked Lake Tanganyika to the Lualaba was completed in 1915, and the construction of a line
from Kambove to Bukama in 1918 meant that the Lomami and Tanganika districts as well as eastern
Katanga were reachable. In the period 1921-5 supplies from these areas increased by 18 per cent. There
were no further extensions until 1928. See Jewsiewicki, ‘Unequal development’, 319-322.
120 Comité Spécial du Katanga, 255-256.
121 Ibid, 243-261.
122 Jewsiewicki, ‘Unequal development’, 326-330. The Chamber of Commerce of Elisabethville described
the project to the Minister of Colonies as follows ‘Il s’agit de distinguer les agglomérations urbaines des
agglomérations agricoles. Les premières grouperont les travailleurs et artisans employés à la ville. Les
besoins de cette catégorie spéciale d’indigènes influenceront la conception des agglomérations nouvelles
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into ‘specialised’ (‘urban’ or agricultural’) units, the scheme was successful in diminishing
Katanga’s dependence on southern African farmers. Imports of maize and maize meal from the
south continued to create some competition, but after 1930, Northern Rhodesian farmers,
aware that they were rapidly losing the Katanga market, diverted their attention to the
protected home market that the development of the Copperbelt offered them.123 In this way,
while before the Depression neither the administration nor the big companies assumed direct
control over the food and labour markets, during and after the depression both became much
more domineering. In Jewsiewicki’s words:
the big companies in Katanga, wanted to lower the cost of living, and especially
the total costs of the industrial Labour force, by a general lowering of
agricultural prices and by offering high industrial wages, which would produce a
supply of labour greater than the demand. In this way, the development of
African market gardening, the first supplies of foodstuffs from Kasai all went
hand in hand with the new labour-recruiting missions of the UMHK and the
policy of labour stabilisation.124
A Vibrant Sub-econom ic Culture: The M arket
The end of Katanga’s total dependence on Northern Rhodesia by no means put an end to crossborder commercial interaction, for the constant flow of travellers and the high concentration of
population that the copper industry induced was accompanied by an automatic mushrooming of
markets in every important mining town. By 1930, markets had become an important enough
part of the economic life of the Copperbelt for the colonial administration of Northern Rhodesia
to enforce regulations. These stipulated that that ‘(1) all markets established in a municipality
or township shall be under the control and management of the local authority’ and that ‘(2) all
markets established by a native authority shall be under the control and management of the
native authority’.125 With these clauses, Northern Rhodesian authorities sanctioned the creation
of markets on a more or less spontaneous basis, leaving local authorities to decide the shape
these markets would take and how they would be organised. Copperbelt markets were to be
copied on the Congo model in which inhabitants from the surrounding country could bring in
dried fish, mealie, etc., for sale.126 By the 1940s, the Copperbelts had become the home of the
largest market complex in Central and Eastern Africa.127 I.D.S. Mackigan, the District Officer for
Chingola, gave a vivid description of the market in Bancroft in 1954:
African life at Bancroft centres round the market, which stands close by the
largest of the Contractor’s Compounds. Many African traders from Kasompe
African township, Chingola bring their wares here; and fish traders from the

lopin de terre qui leur sera concédé moyennant une certaine obligation de défrichement et de mise en
valeur’. See Dubois and Dewailly on behalf of the Comité de la Chambre de Commerce of Elisabethville to
the Minister of the Colonies, 1 June 1932, A.I., 1390, Dossier 2, II-B-11, Annex (Brussels African Archives),
2.
123 Vickery, ‘Saving settlers’, 215.
124 Jewsiewicki, ‘Unequal development’, 324-325.
125 Draft Markets Ordinance, 19 May 1930, SEC2/263, Vol. I, Doc. 7 (NAZ).
126 Ibid.
127 In late 1959 there were 21 markets in the seven towns of the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt. See
Marvin P. Miracle, ‘African markets and trade in the Copperbelt’ in Paul Bohannan & George Dalton (eds.),
Markets in Africa (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1965), 698-99; Robert I. Rotberg, ‘Rural Rhodesian
markets’ in Paul Bohannan & George Dalton (eds.), Markets in Africa (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1965),
585-86.
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North and West, peanut vendors, salad oil sellers, men who boil up old bones
and meat. All these traders operate in the open air or from small thatched
booths. On a market day the scene is gay, animated and noisy, against a
background of bright clothes for sale hung out upon lines or spread upon the
128
ground.
The markets were the main, if not the sole, source of food for the African population in the
mining towns. In 1960 a regional survey of the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt revealed that
there were 120,460 ‘natives’ in employment in all the towns of the Copperbelt, that their total
number was nearing 300,000 and that approximately the same number did their shopping ‘on
the Copperbelt itself’.129 If markets were an important internal business, they were also very
much an international one. In his social and economic study of the Copperbelt markets of 1947,
V.W. Brelsford notes how the Copperbelt not only acted as a magnet to labour but also attracted
‘traders of all types, even from as far afield as Senegal, Gambia and Nigeria’.130 However, the
most represented foreign group on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt was, unsurprisingly, the
Congolese. On a day a random count was operated in the largest market of the Copperbelt, that
of Mufulira, it appeared that fourteen out of the twenty-four sellers were Congo natives.131 In
the same market, the Congo was also the main source of supply including many seasonal
commodities such as mushrooms, maize, shallots, cassava root and leaves, potatoes of several
types, and wild roots. It was calculated that the Copperbelt market in a normal year absorbed
about 3,000 bags of cassava, practically all of which came from the Congo.132 This, Brelsford
argues, is partly due to the fact that ‘Mufulira (…) is the nearest market to the Congo, so that
most of the village produce comes from over the border. The tribe in the nearby area of Katanga
Province of the Congo is also Lamba and among them are settled a number of Northern Province
Rhodesian Natives such as Chisinga, Ushi and Bemba’.133 Northern Rhodesians too made use of
the Katangese markets. It was noted in 1933 that the Solwezi people, who were a bit more
isolated from the Copperbelt economic centres than other groups, still found ‘a ready market for
produce of all kinds at Kapushi Mine in the Congo where a large number of natives are
employed by the Union Minière’.134 In the 1930s, the gradually improved network of roads in
Katanga also made the travelling of people and goods easier as was the expressed intention of
the Katangese authorities that were keen to drain ‘à notre profit les activités neuves de la
Rhodésie du Nord’ and to present the cities of Katanga as ‘les foyers du centre minier de
l’Afrique’ by welcoming the ‘trafic des touristes et des gens d’affaires de la Rhodésie vers le
Katanga et vice versa’.135
As they expanded, markets generally showed an increasing degree of professionalisation of
market skills, generating more and more movement across the border. Peddlers, hawkers and
traders of all kinds, some of whom were European or Indian, carried goods across the border

I. D. S. Mackigan, Chingola District Officer, Tour Report N.1, 1954, WP1/2/18, Doc. 8 (NAZ).
Special Commissioner to Ministry of Land and Natural Resources in Ndola, Report on a Regional Survey
of the Copperbelt, 1 February 1960, WP1/2/64, Doc. 19 (NAZ).
130 William V. Brelsford, Copperbelt markets: A social and economic study (Lusaka: Government Printer,
1947), 12.
131 Ibid, 93.
132 Ibid, 44, 58, 93.
133 Ibid, 93.
134 Secretary for Native Affairs to the Chief Secretary, 25 September 1933, SEC2/263, Vol. I, Doc. 56 (NAZ).
135 The Katangese authorities were keen to drain ‘the new activities of Northern Rhodesia for our benefit’
and to present the cities of Katanga as the ‘focal points of the African mining centre’ by welcoming the
‘traffic of tourists and businessmen from Rhodesia to Katanga and vice versa’. See Dubois and Dewailly on
behalf of the Comité de la Chambre de Commerce of Elisabethville to the Minister of the Colonies, 1 June
1932, A.I., 1390, Dossier 2, II-B-11 (Brussels African Archives), Annex : 8.
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into Katanga and sold them for less than in Katanga’s newly opened shops. Fish, especially dried
fish, from the Mweru-Luapula continued to be a convenience food much in demand on both
Northern Rhodesian and Katangese Copperbelts, though the former was a much more important
consumer than the latter.136 African individuals also spontaneously travelled to the nearest
market, no matter which side of the border it happened to be, to trade the products of their land.
This phenomenon took such proportions that it occasionally became the source of friction. The
fact that Africans could to some extent decide where to do their shopping, and usually did so
where it was most advantageous to them, was not necessarily to the advantage of permanent
shops, or indeed to the advantage of the national economies. Measures taken to deal with these
issues could be really unpopular. Some sources suggest that one reason for the very first strike
that broke out on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, in 1935, was that, between 1934 and
1936, the Belgian Congo border was closed to all Northern Rhodesian trade and produce,
ostensibly as protection against foot and mouth disease.137 An annual report for the Native
Affairs Department mentioned that:
restrictions imposed by the Government of the Belgian Congo on the transit of
produce of every description across the Pedicle have for the time being
practically killed the former flourishing fish trade conducted by natives of the
Northern Province with the copper mines and the Congo. At Fort Rosebery,
where it used to be a common thing to see large numbers of natives on bicycles
laden with fish making for the copper mines, not a single permit was issued
during the year.138
Without the option of engaging in trade, the dependence of individuals on wage labour became
all but absolute. As Perrings argues, ‘it would thus seem reasonable to suggest that what
occurred in 1935 was indicative of the cumulative resentment of those who had experienced
(…) major blows to their capacity for economic survival within a comparatively short space of
time’.139 This episode highlights the extent to which cross-border trade had become both
voluminous and geopolitically significant.

Conclusion
One could draw many parallels between the early development of Northern Rhodesia and
Katanga. Both territories were formed and started their existence under the aegis of large
companies. Both eventually became the economic neuralgic centre of their country. The
population of both was deeply involved in mining, both in their own territory and each other’s.
Yet the extent to which their histories interpenetrated is easy to overlook quite simply because
they cannot be made to fit a structured timeline of events. Developments on either side
happened at a different pace, sometimes separately, sometimes not. The overall picture is – to
put it candidly – messy. Yet the early decades of Copperbelt development can perhaps be
divided into three more or less distinguishable – though by no means time definite – ‘subperiods’. The first ‘sub-period’ is characterised by the rise of Katanga as a major copper

136 Beef was more readily available in Northern Rhodesia. Therefore, fish were not considered an essential
item in worker’s rations, as they were in the Belgian Congo. See Gordon Nachituti’s gift, 70.
137 Charles Perrings, ‘Consciousness and proletarianization: An assessment of the 1935 Mineworker’s
Strike on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 4, no. 1 (1977), 40-41.
138 Department of Native Affairs of Northern Rhodesia, Annual Reports (1934), pp.21-22 as quoted in
Perrings, ‘Consciousness and proletarianization’, 49.
139 Perrings, ‘Consciousness and proletarianization’, 49
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producer on the one hand, and economic stagnation in Northern Rhodesia on the other. The
second is characterised by the rise of Northern Rhodesia as a competing mining power and the
gradual withdrawal of Katanga from its situation of economic dependency on British Africa.
Finally the third ‘sub-period’ is characterised by the Depression of the early 1930s, which not
only had the effect to accelerate some of the trends of the second period but also caused crossborder movements to intensify.
Throughout the late 1910s and the early 1920s, at the time when Northern Rhodesia’s industrial
economy was relatively stagnant, Katanga relied almost exclusively on Northern Rhodesian
labour and foodstuffs. Yet the constantly rising labour and food needs of the Katangese mines
coupled with the take-off of mining in Northern Rhodesia in the late 1920s, left Katanga in a
conundrum to which there were two possible solutions. The first was the abandonment of the
migrant labour policy, which could only be achieved through improvements in production
techniques and the creation of a stabilised, skilled labour force. The second was to force
extensive rural areas to engage in agricultural production. Thanks to the policy of compulsory
cultivation, and thanks also to the fact that the railway network was finally completed on the
eve of the Depression, Katanga’s reliance on Northern Rhodesian labour and foodstuffs
diminished until, with the onset of the Depression, it became marginal. In addition, the
Depression, despite the Copperbelt’s subsequent recovery, had rather profound effects on the
African labourer. For, in a matter of months, the latter suddenly lost its leverage in the labour
market. As a result, it appears that the Depression served to make the border more porous than
it had been before. As employment opportunities dried up throughout southern Africa, people of
all origins crisscrossed the border between Belgian and British Africa in search of better wages
or better options of making money.
Unfortunately, neither the Belgian nor the British colonial government seem to have concerned
themselves excessively with the numerical details of African migration in those early years. As a
result, knowledge about the actual volume of labour migration in this period is patchy. Yet we
may venture two large generalisations. First the master narrative that posits a clear-cut
transition from the ‘classic’ short-term and cyclical migrant system to stabilisation and
urbanisation, does not seem to be supported by the evidence. Instead of simple evolutionary
dualisms, we are faced with complex shifts in patterns of mobility between urban and rural
areas and between countries. Second, African migrants were by no means passive victims of an
all-powerful mining industry. So far as possible, they chose their employer since both wages and
working conditions varied considerably. This caused African labourers, artisans and hangers-on
to crisscross the border for many decades, which they did without following any set pattern. As
Luise White put it:
These movements must be added to the picture of African labour – the jigsaw
puzzle again – (…) in which African workers’ gossip passed on the latest
information about the safest working conditions, the best living conditions, the
best wages. Such talk sent African workers across cultural and colonial
boundaries to work and to make money, where they found themselves in worlds
and seams and stopes that had different safety records, different standards of
140
living, and different rates of remuneration.
Although the region of the Copperbelt had already been the scene of many population
movements in pre-colonial times, the allied effect of an artificial border and the implantation of
two powerful, neighbouring and competing mining industries changed the nature and patterns
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of these movements. This new type of migration had, before anything else, an economic raison
d’être and therefore transcended cultural boundaries.
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